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From Star
to Supernova
to Dark, Cold Neutron Star:
The Early Life, the Explosion
and the Collapse of Arbitration
Michael Hunter Schwartz•

INTRODUCTION

The brightest stars in the sky are both hotter and larger than other stars 1
and they bum more intensely and therefore exhaust their nuclear fuel much
faster. 2 The exhaustion of fuel causes the star to explode, thereby creating
what astronomers call a "supernova," a phenomenon which is as much as 100
billion times brighter than the average star. 3 At the end of the supernova's
short existence, the star partially collapses and becomes a neutron star, which
is an extremely dense, cold star. 4 Thus, the very forces that make these stars
• Assistant Professor of Law, Western State University College of Law. A.B., 1984, University of
California, Berkeley; J.D., 1987, Hastings College of the Law.
I wish to thank Gregg Martino for his help when I first conceived the idea for this article, and Richard
Zepfel for his funny, helpful comments on an earlier draft. My colleague, Leslie Dery, and the editor-inchief of this law review, Lori Smith, also assisted with comments on an earlier draft. I also wish to thank
my wife, Dr. Stacey Hunter Schwartz, for her editorial suggestions and, more importantly, for her unfailing
support of this and all of my other endeavors. Special thanks and gratitude are due my colleague, Susan
Keller, for her wonderful insights and constant support during all phases of the drafting of this article.
I. ALAN LIGIITMAN, TiME FOR THE STARS: ASTRONOMY IN THE 1990s, 32·34 ( 1992).
2. /d. at 35. The brightest stars also are bluer in color than other stars, reflecting the greater heat
produced by burning nuclear fuel so quickly. /d. at 34.
3. /d. at 40-41.
4. /d. at 35, 41. Some neutron stars, those with the greatest mass, completely collapse on themselves
and end up as "black holes," invisible holes in space. /d. at 41.

2

WESTERN STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[22:1

brighter and, therefore, more attractive to us also cause them to explode and
collapse.
In this article, I argue that binding arbitration, 5 a prominent form of
Alternative Dispute Resolution ("ADR"), 6 is such a star, destined to bum out
and collapse on itself and become a dim part of ADR. 7
Arbitration has existed in America since before the inception of the
United States. 8 Nevertheless, for most of its history in the United States,
arbitration has been held in contempt by the courts and the legal profession. 9
In Part I of this article, I review the history of arbitration up to the explosion
of arbitration in the mid- to late twentieth century.
Recently, criticism of courtroom adjudication 10 has drastically increased. 11
Critics assert that adjudication is slow, expensive, and rigid at the expense of
being just. They also argue that adjudication unwisely persists in trying to
address disputes in specialized areas which are beyond its competence, and that
adjudication polarizes parties by dividing them into winners and losers. 12
In what appears to be an attempt to respond to some of these criticisms,
the bar, the judiciary and academics have begun to advocate the increased use
of all forms of ADR. This increase in advocacy of ADR has been dubbed the
"ADR Movement." 13 In addition, the actual use of all forms of ADR, and, in
particular, of arbitration, has greatly increased. 14 Advocates hail arbitration as

5. The tenns "arbitration" and "binding arbitration" will be used in this article interchangeably to refer
only to out-of-court hearings in which one or more independent persons, the arbitrator(s), decide who wins
and what is won, and that result is, as a practical matter, final. DAVID MELLINKOFF, MELLINKOFF's
DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN LEGAL USAGE 33 (1992). Non-binding arbitration is the same as binding
arbitration except that either party to a non-binding arbitration has the option to reject the arbitrator's
decision and obtain a trial de novo. /d. This article does not address non-binding arbitration. Another
distinction often made in articles addressing arbitration is between contractual or voluntary arbitration, on
the one hand, and court-ordered arbitration, which is also known as court-annexed arbitration, on the other.
The former requires an agreement between the parties to arbitrate their dispute whereas the latter occurs
when a court orders the parties to arbitrate. This article does not distinguish between binding voluntary and
court-annexed arbitration because the issues identified apply to all forms of binding arbitration.
6. The term ADR will be used in this article in a broad sense to refer to any method of resolving a
legal dispute that does not involve a trial in a court established by a state or federal government. /d. at 16.
ADR includes, among other things, arbitration, mediation, and mini-trials. /d.
7. This article does not address the efficacy of other forms of ADR. For argument~ that mediation also
has deficiencies, especially for women, see Trina Grillo, The Mediation Alternative: Process Dangers for
Women, 100 YALE L.J. 1545 (1991); Penelope E. Bryan, Killing Us Softly: Divorce Mediation and the
Politics of Power, 40 BUFF. L. REV. 441 (1992).
8. See infra note 20 and accompanying text.
9. See i~fra notes 28-49 and accompanying text.
I 0. Throughout this article the term "adjudication" will be used to refer to trial in a state or federal
courtroom where either a jury or judge is the trier of fact.
II. See infra notes 55 - 61 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 62- 69 and accompanying text.
13. See, e.g., Kenneth Penegar, Preface: The Elusive Promise of Legal Reform, 46 SMUL. REV. 1889,
1890 (1993) (arguing that the "ADR Movement" is the most significant change in the legal system in the
twentieth century).
14. See infra notes 50- 54 and accompanying text.

1994]

THE COLLAPSE OF ARBITRATION

3

one of the brightest forms of dispute resolution. 15 They argue that arbitration
is a faster, cheaper and perhaps even better form of dispute resolution than
adjudication. 16 I see this expansion phase in the history of arbitration as the
supernova of arbitration, the time when arbitration has generated the most
excitement. In Part ll of this article I trace the rise of arbitration and examine
its asserted benefits.
The very qualities that make arbitration seem attractive, however, are also
the qualities that will cause it, at least as an important and often-used form of
dispute resolution, to collapse. In fact, identification of possible instabilities
in the arbitration star have already been made. 17 In Part Ill of this article, I
describe the problems which have been identified, detail additional problems
and argue that the problems derive from the very attributes of arbitration that
have been lauded. In Part IV, I describe possible solutions to the problems.
Finally, in Part V of this article, I elucidate my thesis that addressing the
problems of arbitration will cause it to collapse. I argue that the proposed
solutions will fail on three different levels. First, some of the deficiencies of
arbitration cannot be remedied. Second, the solutions for arbitration's ills
necessarily will involve adapting procedures from adjudication to arbitration;
such adaptation will prove difficult to tailor to the arbitration form and difficult
to implement. Finally, attempts to save arbitration will make arbitration so
much like court trials that the qualities that have made arbitration attractive
will be lost.
Arbitration will be squeezed between the pressure to expand, in response
to society's concerns regarding court trials, and the pressure to improve, which
requires making arbitration more like adjudication. If the only way to save
arbitration is to make it like adjudication, and if, even then, we really cannot
cure arbitration's deficiencies, arbitration must collapse on itself. Like a
supernova which is compressed by the extraordinary pressure of gravity into
a cold, dark, neutron star, arbitration cannot survive the pressures inherent in
its nature. Eventually, arbitration must cease being an important part of the
ADR Movement.

15. See Jethro K. Liebennan and James F. Henry, Lessons from the Alternative Dispute Resolution
Movement, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 424, (1986); Jane B. Kom, Changing Our Perspective on Arbitration: A
Traditional and a Feminist View, 1991 U. ILL. L. REv. 67 (1991); Alan S. Rau, Resolving Disputes Over
Attorneys' Fees: The Role of ADR, 46 SMU L. REV. 2005 (1993).
16. See, e.g., Leo Kanowitz, Alternative Dispute Resolution and the Public Interest: The Arbitration
Experience, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 239, 255 (1987).
17. See Richard Delgado et al., Fairness and Formality: Minimizing the Risk of Prejudice in
Alternative Dispute Resolution, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 1359 ( 1985); Edward Brunet, Questioning the Quality
ofAlternative Dispute Resolution, 62 TuL. L. REv. 1 (1987); Richard Reuben, The Dark Side of ADR, CAL.
LAw., (Feb. 1994, at 53).
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I. THE HISTORY OF ARBITRATION
From Colonial Times to the Twentieth Century

Concerns regarding problems with the speed, cost, capacity, and
flexibility of adjudication, which, in recent years, have spawned the ADR
movement, 18 were first raised when arbitration came to the New World.
Arbitration has been traced as far back as thirteenth century England. 19
Along with its legal system, England exported arbitration, pretty much in its
current form, to its American colonies. 20 The colonists' distrust of the law and
desire for social harmony caused them to seek means other than adjudication
to resolve disputes. 21
By the mid-eighteenth century, the colonial merchants had come to
perceive a conflict between judicial settlement of disputes and their need for
privacy and cooperation. 22 They therefore developed their own private
tribunals using merchant decision-makers. In fact, one of the reasons the
merchants formed the New York Chamber of Commerce was their desire to
organize arbitration of disputes. 23
At the same time, the eighteenth century saw a great rise in preference for
adjudication as a means of dispute resolution. As a result, adjudication became
the overwhelming norm for dispute resolution. 24 This preference is reflected
in the United States Constitution, in which the legal system is given co-equal
status with the executive and legislative branches of government. 25
The nineteenth century included periods of minor rises in the popularity
of arbitration. The conflicts between the former slaves and former slave
owners often were resolved in "Freedman's Tribunals," which, in practice,
appear to have been a means for reenforcing white power and white supremacist views. 26 Arbitration also was championed in the latter part of the
nineteenth century as a means of calming labor tensions. 27 The judiciary,
however, was overtly hostile to and distrustful of arbitration. 28

18. See infra notes 54-61 and accompanying text.
19. Soia Mentschikoff, Commercial Arbitration, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 846, 854 (1961).
20. JEROLD S. AUERBACH, JUSTICE WITHOlJT LAW? 4, 20 (1983). For example, arbitration is explicitly
identified as a preferred means of dispute resolution in a 1635 Boston ordinance. /d. at 23.
21. /d. at 19-20.
22. /d. at 33.
23. Mentschikoff, supra note 19, at 855.
24. AUERBACH, .fupra note 20, at 41.
25. THE FEDERALIST No. 80, at 476 (Alexander Hamilton) (New American Library 1961).
26. AUERBACH, supra note 20, at 59.
27. /d. at 62.
28. See Kanowitz, supra note 16, at 254.
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The Early and Mid-Twentieth Century History of Arbitration

The twentieth century has seen the increased legalization of arbitration;
it has moved away from its historical a-legal approach and status and has
29
become more law-bound and law-govemed. In 1920, for example, New
York enacted the first pro-arbitration statute, which provided that errors of law
30
by an arbitrator were not grounds for setting aside an arbitration award, and
that agreements to arbitrate could not be revoked. 31 Until very recently,
however, the courts continued to regard arbitration with considerable disdain.
Insight into this disdain can be gained from examining how early midtwentieth century courts discussed arbitration. 32 A 1918 California Supreme
Court opinion declared that an arbitration clause is "void as an attempted
interference with the power and jurisdiction of the courts to decide controversies between parties to contracts."33 The suggestion that arbitration interferes
with the "power" and "jurisdiction" of the legal system suggests a belief that
arbitration posed a competitive threat to the legal system.
The use of the word "void" is also significant. It suggests that an
arbitration clause is not merely undesirable but is, in fact, so repugnant that it
should be deemed never to have existed at all. Arbitration clauses, of course,
are simply contract terms. In contract law, the use of the term "void" typically
is used only for illegal contracts, such as a promise to kill someone in
exchange for money. Because killing is a crime, the courts hold that such a
promise is "void."34 Here, the word "void" means that the promises do not
create any obligation.
In contrast, contracts with persons who lack the capacity to contract, such
as minors, and contracts entered into on the basis of mistake or even fraud are
described as "voidable."35 Even many illegal bargains are designated merely
as "unenforceable," rather than as void. 36 Thus, the use of the word "void"
29. AUERBACH, supra note 20, at 110-11.
30. Menl~chikoff, supra note 19, at 856.
31. AUERBACH, supra note 20, at 104.
32. In several places in this article, the language used by courts in discussing arbitration is examined
in an attempt to gain insight into how the legal system viewed arbitration. This close textual analysis stems
from a belief that an author's (or judge's) views may be revealed in the tone and structure of what she writes
even if she was not consciously aware of those views. This practice is commonly employed in other fields,
such as literary criticism. See, e.g., D. W. HARDING, Regulated Hatred: An Aspect of the Work of Jane
Austin, in 20TH CENTURY LITERARY CRmCISM: A READER 263 (D. Lodge ed., 1972) (arguing that, contrary
to appearances, Jane Austin's work contains evidence that she greatly disliked the society depicted in her
novels). The application of techniques of literary criticism to legal opinions is justified by the fact that,
"Judges ... resemble literary artists in the close artention they pay to the choice of words in which to
express themselves ...." RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE, 8 (1988).
33. North American Co. v. Outer Harbor Co., 178 Cal. 406,413, 173 P. 756, 759 (1918).
34. JOHN D. CALAMARI AND JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CONTRACTS, §§ 1-11, at 18 (West 3d ed., 1987).
35. /d. at 19.
36. /d.
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expresses legal conclusions of illegality and non-recognition and reflects a very
strong judicial antipathy for arbitration.
This antipathy existed even in New York where arbitration was first given
statutory recognition as an enforceable contractual promise. In re Friedman, 31
which was decided six years after the enactment of the New York's proarbitration statute, express a large measure of fear and distrust of arbitration.
Friedman addressed the seemingly simple question of whether an arbitrator's
decision could be enforced where the arbitrator received a substantial loan
from one of the litigants during the pendency of the arbitration. 38 The
Friedman court held that the decision should not be enforced. 39 What is
striking is the court's explanation of some of the reasons for its decision. The
court stated:
During recent years arbitration has been more and more resorted to for the
settlement of business controversies. It therefore becomes of the utmost
importance that .. . where the rights of parties are adjudicated, not by
trained lawyers and judges, but by fellow business men, every safeguard
possible should be thrown about the proceeding .... 40

The court's perception of a need for extra safeguards suggests some
distrust of arbitrators and arbitration. This distrust is more clearly manifested
in how, and by what language, the court juxtaposes the legal system with
arbitration. The court chooses the word "trained" to describe lawyers and
judges, who, the court emphasizes, will not be deciding the case. The court
states that, instead, the case will be decided by businessmen arbitrators. The
only adjective used to describe the arbitrators is the word "fellow." The use
of the word "fellow" to modify businessmen, especially given its context, in
a parallel structure comparing arbitrators to the "trained lawyers and judges,"
seems both to suggest that businessmen are not qualified and to reflect a belief
that there may be some sort of collusion (fellowship) among these businessmen
in arbitrating rather than adjudicating each other's disputes.
Equally revealing is the court's unusual choice in words for the suggestion that more protection is needed for arbitration. The court tells us that
safeguards need to be "thrown about" the arbitration proceeding. The physical
image of safeguards being thrown about a proceeding reflects tremendous fear
of arbitration. It suggests that the court views arbitrations as being haphazard,
rather than reasoned and controlled. It also suggests that arbitration is so out
of control that extra safeguards are needed for arbitration because some of the
safeguards may miss their targets and, therefore, fail to protect the parties.
37.
38.
39.
40.

213 N.Y.S. 369 (1926).
/d. at 375.
/d.
ld. at 375-76 (emphasis added).
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Because I believe that safeguards are more typically "adopted" or perhaps
"utilized" or "applied," I see this language as reflecting a fundamental distrust
of arbitration as a method of dispute resolution.
A few years later, Congress followed New York's lead in making
arbitration agreements irrevocable by enacting the Federal Arbitration Act. 41
The first Uniform Arbitration Act was approved by the National Conference
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and the American Bar Association
in 1955.42 A 1953 Supreme Court opinion makes it clear, however, that
considerable judicial distrust of arbitration continued through the midtwentieth century.
Wilco v. Swan43 involved a question regarding the ability to arbitrate a
claim for damages under section 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933.44 The
parties' contract contained an express arbitration clause. 45 When the plaintiff
sued in the District Court for the Southern District of New York, the defendant
moved to stay the action pending arbitration of the plaintiff's claims in
accordance with the contractual arbitration clause. 46
The plaintiff challenged the stay, arguing that the arbitration clause
constituted a waiver of the Securities Act's explicit grant of a right to sue in
federal court, and that any waiver of a right conferred by the Act is "void.'147
The Supreme Court agreed. 48 While the holding itself seems to reflect a strong
distrust of arbitration, the Court's explanation of the reasons for its decision
leaves no doubt that the Court disliked arbitration:
This case requires subjective findings on the purpose and knowledge of an
alleged violator of the Act. They must be not only determined but applied
by the arbitrators without judicial instruction on the law. As their award
may be made without explanation of their reasons and without a complete
record ... the arbitrators' conception of the legal meaning of such statutory
requirements as "burden of proof," "reasonable care" or "material fact,"
... cannot be examined. 49

The Court's concern regarding the "arbitrators' conception" of relatively
easy legal concepts such as "burden of proof' and "material fact" suggests that
the Supreme Court believed that arbitrators cannot handle even relatively
simple legal issues. The Court also focused on what it perceived to be missing
41.
42.
43.
(1989).
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

9 U .S.C. § I et seq. (1947).
Unif. Arbitration Act, 7 U.L.A. 5 (1955).
346 U.S. 427 (1953) overruled by de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477

/d.
/d.
/d.
/d.
/d.
/d.

at 428.
at 429.
at 430.
at 434-35.
at 435-36.
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in arbitration, a focus which is reflected in the Court's repeated use of the word
"without." Although Congress appeared to have developed confidence in
arbitration by 1953, the Court was not yet ready to concur.
It was not until fairly recently that the pressure on the legal system
became so great that ADR became an institution in itself, revered not only by
the public, but also by judges, lawyers, and law professors.
II. THE EXPLOSION OF ARBITRATION

Arbitration in the Late Twentieth Century
In the past few years there has been dramatic change in the legal community's attitude towards arbitration. Arbitration has changed from being
relatively unused and disdained to being a popular, oft-championed form of
dispute resolution. Arbitration of disputes has exploded; binding arbitration
clauses are being written into a greatly increasing number of contracts50 in a
wide variety of contexts, from employment contracts to construction and real
estate contracts, and from insurance contracts to securities contracts. 51 Even
the morning cereal is not immune; General Mills recently announced that its
Honey Nut Cheerios cereal boxes now will include arbitration clauses for
disputes arising out of General Mills' Sega game sweepstakes. 52
Disputes therefore are being arbitrated in increasing numbers. For
example, Judicial Arbitration and Mediation Service, Inc. (JAMS) has grown
by more than 2,300% in just the past six years. 53 Commentators usually trace
this change to an increase in dissatisfaction with courtroom dispute
resolution, 54 the expression of which has also greatly increased in recent years.

The Criticism of Adjudication
The criticisms of adjudication can be divided into two categories: (a)
criticisms of the efficiency of adjudication and (b) criticisms relating to the
quality of adjudication.

50. Reuben, supra note 17, at 54.
51. /d. at 55.
52. PAMELA SEBASTIAN, Business Bulletin: Breakfast of Arbitrators?, WALL ST. J., June 30, 1994,
at I.
53. Reuben, supra note 17, at 55.
54. See AUERBACH, supra note 20, at 123; Reuben, supra note 17, at 54; BRUNET, supra note 17, at
2-3; Kanowitz, supra note 16, at 255, 303. But see Louis J. Weber, Jr., Court-Referred ADR and the
Lawyer-Mediator: In Service of Whom, 46 SMU L. REV. 2113 (1993) (arguing that the rise in attorney
support of ADR stems from a self-interest in arbitrating or mediating the disputes for income).
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Efficiency Criticisms. Citing the increased case load of the courts,
commentators argue that the legal system is simply too slow. 55 At least some
commentators, however, dispute the caseload statistics. These commentators
contend that the statistics are inflated by the inclusion of undisputed matters
such as name changes, uncontested divorces and the probate of wills. The
filing of these matters, the commentators argue, has increased disproportionately in recent years. 56 Even given the possibility of inflation, the increase in
court filings is startling. More than two and a half times more cases were filed
in 1980 than in 1934.57 Moreover, the time from filing to trial, at least in some
areas, now is three years or longer. 58 Experts predict that the situation
probably will worsen in the future; filings are expected to triple in the next
twenty-five years. 59
Critics of adjudication also argue that the cost of adjudication has become
so prohibitive that most people cannot afford to resolve their disputes in
court. 60 For example, a partner with a national law firm regularly warns his
clients that a typical commercial case requiring one week of trial probably will
cost the client between $100,000 and $150,000. He also tells them that a
number of his cases have not merely exceeded the $150,000 high-side estimate
but actually have doubled it. 61
Quality Criticisms.
Others have criticized the legal system for being
disconnected from the real world. In other words, some critics question the
ability of a rigid, rule-based system to resolve complicated disputes where
conventional answers based on conventional notions of property and rights
may be impossible. 62 For example, traditional race and sex discrimination
doctrine is flawed because it demarginalizes those who fall within the
intersection of both, such as black women. 63 Courts and commentators deny
the compound nature of the experience of black women by treating them as
being either too much like women to represent blacks or too much like blacks
55. See, e.g., Judge Robert M. Parker & Leslie J. Hagin, "ADR" Techniques in the Refoi77Ullion Model
of Civil Dispute Resolution, 46 SMU L. REV. 1905, 1907 (1993).
56. See Brunet, supra note 17, at 5.
57. Judith Resnick, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374, 396 n.85 (1982-1983).
58. Parker & Hagin, supra note 55, at 1908.
59. /d. at 1909.
60. /d. at 1906.
61. Notes of June 21, 1994, telephone conversation on file with author. The name of the speaker and
of his law finn have been withheld on request. It is my understanding that the billing rates of the law firm
actually are lower than many of its competitors' rates.
62. See Peter Gabel & Paul Harris, Building Power and Breaking Images: Critical Legal Theory and
the Practice of Law, II N.Y.U. L. & Soc. CHANGE 369 (1982-83).
63. Kimberle W. Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist
Critique ofAntidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics, 1989 UNIV. CHI. LEGAL
F. 139 (1989).
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to represent women or by ignoring the intersection of both in cases involving
black women. 64
•
Commentators also argue that the legal system polarizes the parties by
dividing them into winners and losers and thereby forfeits any possibility of a
resolution that might preserve the parties' relationship. 65 The courts do not
consider and, usually, cannot consider compromise or flexible solutions to the
disputes before them. As a result, court trials may increase rather than soothe
hostilities. 66
Another criticism often articulated is that courts are forced to address
disputes in specialized areas which are beyond their competence. 67 Some
argue that it is too "daunting" to a litigant or her68 attorney to have to educate
a jury or judge about particular industry practices. 69
The Rise of Arbitration
Although the connection between the increase of criticism of the legal
system and the rise of arbitration as a popular means of dispute resolution is
unclear, the drastic change in the legal system's and the public's attitude
towards arbitration is unmistakable. Arbitration is praised by its proponents
with almost evangelical fervor; 70 even those who have been critical of some
aspect of arbitration or ADR or who advocate avoiding arbitration or ADR
under certain circumstances nevertheless hasten to communicate that they
value arbitration as a means of dispute resolution. 71 Arbitration has become
politically correct.
The language used by the courts in recent cases to discuss arbitration
reflects this drastic change and stands in sharp contrast to the language found
in earlier twentieth century cases like Wilco and Friedman. In Perini Corp. v.
Great Bay Hotel & Casino, lnc., 12 the New Jersey Supreme Court noted that
"judicial attitudes about arbitration have changed significantly" from
"mistrust" to a "strong commitment to arbitration." 73 More significantly, the
court defined arbitration as "'a substitution, by consent of the parties, of
64. /d.
65. /d. at 2025 . See also Kom, supra note 15, at 102.
66. Crenshaw, supra note 63, at 2025 .
67. See, e.g., Rau, supra note 15, at 2029.
68. In this article, I use only female gender pronouns where gender is neutral, much as, in traditional
legal writing, only male gender pronouns are used. This choice stems from my belief that such
juxtapositions of traditional forms have the potential for transforrnative power. For a discussion of the
transfo1111lltive possibilities inherent in pornography, see Susan E. Keller, Review Essay: Justify My Love,
18 W. ST. U. L. REv .'463 (1990).
69. Rau, supra note 15, at 2029.
70. See sources cited supra note 54.
71. See, e.g., Delgado et al., supra note 17, at 1402; Brunet, supra note 17, at 56.
72. 610 A.2d 364 (N.J. 1992).
73. /d. at 369.
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another tribunal for the tribunal provided by the ordinary process of law,' and
its object is 'the final disposition, in a speedy, inexpensive, expeditious and
perhaps less formal manner, of the controversial differences between the
parties."'74
The change in judicial attitude towards arbitration here is dramatic.
While the Friedman court contrasted the "trained" decision-makers in
adjudication with the "fellow businessmen" decision-makers in arbitration/5
the Perini court uses the same word, "tribunal," to describe both adjudication
and arbitration. To the Perini court, arbitration is simply a "substitution" of
one equal for another. Likewise, although the Wilco court expressed doubt
about the quality of arbitral justice, 76 the Perini court details arbitration's
virtues: "speedy, inexpensive, expeditious and perhaps less forrnal." 77
The Supreme Court also appears to have changed its opinion of
arbitration drastically. In Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express,
/nc./ 8 the Supreme Court expressly overruled Wilco and held that a claim of
a securities violation was arbitrable. 79 In so holding, the Court contrasted what
it called the "old judicial hostility to arbitration" with "our current strong
endorsement of ... [arbitration]."80 This "strong endorsement" sharply
contrasts with the Wilco court's criticisms of arbitration. 81
The Asserted Benefits of Arbitration

Kenneth Penegar notes that the asserted benefits of arbitration can be
divided into two categories, not unlike the two categories identified above with
respect to the criticisms of courtroom dispute resolution. What Penegar calls
the "cool" benefits of arbitration, greater speed and lower cost, 82 correspond
to the efficiency criticisms of adjudication; what Penegar calls the "warm"
· benefits of arbitration, its greater flexibility, its ability to use "expert" decision
makers, and its ability to make decisions that preserve relationships, 83
correspond to the quality criticisms of adjudication. An additional "warm"
benefit asserted for arbitration, which Penegar does not address and categorize,
is that arbitration is private. 84

74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

/d. quoting Barcon Assoc. v. Tri-County Asphalt, 430 A.2d 214 (N.J. 1981).
See In re Friedman, 213 N.Y.S. 369 (1926).
See Wilco v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
Perini Corp. v. Great Bay Hotel & Casino, Inc., 610 A.2d 364, 369 (N.J. 1992).
490 u.s. 477 (1989).
/d. at 480.
/d. at 480-81.
See supra notes 43 - 49 and accompanying text.
Penegar, supra note 13, at 1892.
/d.
Mentschikoff, supra note 19, at 849; Rau, supra note 15, at 2029.
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Analysis of "Cool" Benefits of Arbitration
The "cool" benefits of arbitration, greater speed and lesser cost, are
readily apparent and are not subjects of great dispute. Actually, the two
benefits are intertwined; part of what makes arbitration cheaper is that it is
faster. Arbitrations, on the average, are completed more quickly than
adjudications. 85 The greater speed is attributable to the availability of more
arbitrators than judges, the lack of discovery, and the informality of arbitration.
Although the participants in arbitration must pay the fees of the decisionmaker, this expenditure is more than offset by savings in attorney's fees. 86
This reduction in attorney's fees probably stems from a combination of factors.
Arbitration is less formal. Arbitrators ignore evidentiary issues. Formal
presentation of evidence is eschewed in favor of informal story-telling.
Informality and the lack of evidentiary disputes save attorney time and effort,
thereby reducing attorney fees. Arbitration also lacks formal pleading and
discovery, which tend to extend the time until trial and result in the payment
of substantial attorney fees.

Analysis of the "Warm" Benefits of Arbitration
Unless judicial involvement is sought either to confirm the arbitration
award or to request judicial review of an arbitration award, arbitration occurs
in private. It is much less clear that the other "warm" benefits attributed to
arbitration, namely flexibility, relationship-preservation and expertise in the
area of dispute, actually occur.
Parties to arbitration sometimes do select an expert decision-maker. The
existence of actual incarnations of the ideal arbitrator, a flexible, knowledgeable, relationship-oriented decision-maker, never has been shown. Rather,
arbitrators often are simply practicing or semi-retired attorneys or retired
judges,87 and most arbitrators strive to follow the law. 88 Even an arbitrator who
has expertise in the area of the dispute may not meet the asserted ideal. A lack
of experience outside the arbitrator's area of expertise may produce decisions
that have a pro-field bias or may limit the arbitrator's world-view so that it
narrows her perception of the spectrum of resolution alternatives.

85. See Rau, supra note 15, at 2027 n.83 (avemge time to completion of arbitmtion is a little over four
months); Parker & Hagin, supra note 55, at 1908 (avemge time to completion of adjudication is 11.7
months).
86. Rau, supra note 15, at 2028-29.
87. AUERBACH, supra note 20, at Ill.
88. /d. at I 10- 11.
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III. THE DEFICIENCIES OF ARBITRATION
In a sense, the vices of arbitration are its virtues. In the first part of this
section, deficiencies are categorized as (1) process flaws, (2) symbolic or
systemic flaws or (3) results flaws. If the deficiency arises out of arbitration's
lack of formal procedures and codes of behavior, it is categorized as a process
flaw. If the deficiency stems from the loss of the symbolic or systemic value
of the courtroom process, it is categorized as a symbolic or systemic flaw.
Finally, if the deficiency relates to the absolute finality given to arbitrator
decisions, it is categorized as a results flaw. 89
In the second part of this section, I connect the deficiencies to the benefits
that engendered them. In so doing, I reveal the complicated relationships
between the categories adopted in this section (process flaws, symbolic or
systemic flaws and results flaws), on the one hand, and the asserted deficiencies of adjudication (efficiency and quality) and the asserted benefits of
arbitration (warm and cool), on the other.
Throughout this section, California arbitration law is used as the basis for
analysis. California arbitration law is not unusual or unique in any of the areas
discussed below.
Identification and Analysis of Deficiencies
Process Flaws
Disclosure of Parties' Claims and Defenses. There is no statutory or
judicial requirement that either party to an arbitration fully disclose the nature,
extent and amount of either her claims or her defenses. The American
Arbitration Association (''AAA"), the organization responsible for administering many arbitration claims throughout the United States, provides, upon
request, claim forms which request information regarding the complaining
party's complaints. 90 Neither use of the forms nor any other method of claim
disclosure is required either by statute or by court decision. 91 The AAA forms
themselves require only that a claimant disclose the nature of the claim. For
89. Policy arguments on both sides of the issue are discussed in recognition of the indeterminacy of
policy argument. See Duncan Kennedy, Freedom and Constraint in Adjudication: A Critical
Phenomenology, 36 J. LEGAL Eouc. 518, 534-35 (1986).
90. See AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASS'N, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION CLAIM FORM [hereinafter AAA
FoRM]. The form allows the complaining party approximately one inch each for the party to state "The
Nature of the Dispute" and "The Claim or Relief Sought."
91. Neither California's arbitration statutes nor the Uniform Arbitration Act require disclosure of a
party's claims at the pleading stage.
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example, the claimant need only disclose that the claim is for "breach of
contract," and the claimant is seeking "such damages as may appear to the
arbitrator to be just and proper.'.n Thus, a property owner might present an
arbitration claim to her general contractor for breach of contract without
detailing the specific construction deficiencies or the amount she claims as
damages.
According to Jack Friedenthal, Mary Kay Kane and Arthur Miller, such
disclosure is crucial to the just resolution of disputes; they argue that pleading
requirements serve two important purposes. Pleading requirements ensure
minimal disclosure by both parties, which assist the parties in preparing their
strategies. These requirements also provide information to the court which
facilitates the court's efforts in managing and helping to resolve the parties'
claims. 93 Other commentators argue that disclosure necessarily slows the
speed of and increases the expense of dispute resolution. 94 Formal pleading
and pleading disputes require attorney and court time, thereby increasing
attorney fees.

Exchange of Evidence. No discovery in any form is required by
arbitration law. 95 The parties are left to their own imaginations with respect to
case preparation. They therefore risk losing crucial evidence that may be
available only from their opponents. As the Supreme Court explained in
Hickman v. Taylor, 96 the open discovery policy established by the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure means that "civil trials ... need [not] be carried on
in the dark." 97
In fact, there is no requirement, at least in a case involving $50,000 or
less, that either party disclose the name and nature of any testimony to be given
by any witness. 98 This rule holds true for both percipient and expert witnesses.
Consequently, neither party can anticipate nor respond to the other party's
witnesses.
The absence of disclosure, either by formal pleading or through
discovery, of the nature, extent or amount of the claimant's complaints leaves
disputants completely unable to allocate resources, negotiate settlement, or
determine the need for their own expert witnesses. In short, plotting strategy
in arbitrations is guesswork.
92. See AAA FORM, supra note 90.
93. JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE, 240 (2d ed., 1993).
94. See. e g, Ran, wpm note 15.-at-2028~._ _ _ _.:____ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
95.
96.
97.
98.

1283.05 (West 1994).
329 u.s. 495 (1947).
/d. at 501.
CAL. Clv. PRoc. CODE§ 1282.2 (West 1994).
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE§
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Of course, if the parties are in a long-standing relationship, such
guesswork, as a practical matter, may not be difficult. In any event, there is a
consensus that attorneys and parties often abuse discovery in adjudication; 99
such abuse slows the time to trial and increases attorney fees. 100

Evidentiary Limitations. The rules of evidence also do not apply to
arbitrations. 101 Some argue that, as a whole, evidence rules are too abstract,
too hierarchical and too adversarial, 102 and individual evidence rules are
antiquated. Nevertheless, at least some evidentiary objections can be seen as
salutary.
For example, the hearsay objection 103 reflects a distrust of statements
made by a person who (a) was not present in court when the statement was
made so that the trier of fact may judge her credibility, (b) is not subject to
cross-examination, and (c) was not under oath when the statement was made
so she had no legal compulsion to be truthful. 104 If a court is convinced that the
hearsay evidence is credible, the court will admit it. 105 In arbitration, neither
the policies underlying the hearsay rule nor its exceptions are entertained.
Instead, untrustworthy hearsay evidence is regularly admitted.
The various privileges, including the doctor-patient and spousal
communications privileges, 106 arguably also have benefits worth considering.
The privileges reflect a choice to forego the presentation of relevant evidence
to protect personal privacy and to encourage frank, open and honest communication between doctor and patient or between spouses. 107 The prohibition
against the use of settlement negotiations as evidence 108 reflects the similar
goal of encouraging frank and open settlement negotiations. 109
The power of courts to exclude potentially relevant evidence where the
value of the evidence is substantially outweighed by the potential to unfairly
prejudice the fact-finder 110 reflects a different choice. The courts have

99. See, e.g., FR1EDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 93, at 422.
100. See Rau, supra note 15, at 2028.
101. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE§ 1282.2(d) (West 1994).
102. Kit Kinports, Evidence Engendered, 1991 U. ILL. L. REV. 413 (1991).
103. See, e.g., CAL. EVID. CODE§§ 1200 et. seq. (West 1994).
104. MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE,§ 245, at 93. (John W. Strong ed., 4th ed. 1992).
I 05. /d. § 324, at 363-64. Examples of where this policy has been applied by the legislature to
conclude that such statements always are admissible include the exception to the hearsay rule for a statement
made by a dying person regarding the cause of her death and a statement that is an ad'inission of
wrongdoing. See, e.g., CAL. Evm. CODE§§ 1242, 1220 (West 1994). In both these situations, the court
has reason to believe that the speaker is trustworthy.
106. See, e.g., CAL. EVID. CODE§§ 980,992 (West 1994).
107. MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 104, § 72 at 269-70.
108. See, e.g., CAL. EVID. CODE§ 1152 (West 1994).
109. MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 104, § 72.1 at 271.
110. See, e.g., CAL. EVID. CODE§ 352 (West 1994).
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determined that the risk of prejudicing or misleading the fact-finder can be so
significant that it may choose to withhold somewhat relevant evidence. 111
The absence of these objections in arbitration raises the potential for a
chilling effect on communications society wishes to encourage and a greater
possibility that an arbitrator could be biased by learning highly prejudicial
facts. 112
The discovery deficiencies described above produce an interesting effect:
arbitration has the potential to flip society's evidentiary aspirations. Because
evidence cannot be obtained through discovery in arbitration, some evidence
is not introduced that society probably would wish to be introduced. At the
same time, because evidence cannot be barred by rules of evidence in an
arbitration, some evidence is introduced that society probably would not wish
to be introduced.
Witness Honesty. Arbitration law does not require witnesses to testify
under oath. 113 An oath requirement certainly does not ensure honesty by
witnesses, however, the lack of an oath and the implicit threat of sanctions for
perjury may encourage arbitration witnesses to lie. Criminal sanctions have
some deterrent effect at least if the person who is contemplating a criminal act
believes that she is very likely to be caught, convicted and punished. 114
Because adjudication perjury occurs before a judge, who ostensibly has the
power to punish the perjurer, the threat of punishment for perjury arguably has
a deterrent effect.
Selection, Qualifications and Integrity of Arbitrator.
Several factors
combine to make the process of arbitrator selection problematic. There are no
legally required qualifications for one to be, or hold herself out as, an
arbitrator. 115 Moreover, arbitrators do not swear an oath before performing
their arbitral duties, 116 and arbitrators are not bound by any established ethical
standards. 117 There is no formal review of complaints regarding arbitrators. 118

Ill. MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note I 04, § 185 at 780-81.
112. The dangers of introducing inappropriately prejudicial facts may be even greater in an informal
setting like arbitration than in a formal setting like adjudication. Bias is more likely in informal settings.
See Delgado et al., supra note 17, at 1388-89.
113. CAL C1v. PRoc. CODE§ 1282.2(d) (West 1994); Sapp v. Barenfeld, 34 Cal. 2d 515,520,212
P.2d 233, 237 (1949).
114. See Michael Davis, Book Review: Why Punish? by Nigel Walker, 12 L. & PHIL. 395 (1993).
115. Robinson v. Superior Court, 35 Cal. 2d 379, 387, 218 P.2d 10, 16 (1950).
I 16. 6 CAL. )UR. § 36, at 7 7 (3d ed. 1994).
117. Reuben, supra note 17, at 55. Rueben also notes that arbitrators cannot be reviewed by the state
Commission on Judicial Performance or even by the State Bar Association.
I 18. /d. at 53.
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There is no empirical evidence that arbitrators decide cases unjustly or
unethically. Arbitrators, however, are expected to self-monitor conflicts of
interest, 119 even though the potential for conflicts of interest are great. Unlike
most judges, arbitrators not only have separate business interests that may
create conflicts, but arbitrators also have an economic self-interest in deciding
cases in such a way as to maximize the possibility of getting return business. 120
This latter potential conflict stems from the fact that arbitrators often
perform their services as a career or at least as a way of supplementing their
income from practicing law or from working in another field of expertise. An
income-maximizing arbitrator has a strong incentive to decide the disputes she
hears in favor of the party and/or the attorney who is most likely to need
arbitral services again. For example, in a dispute between a large construction
company and a one-woman tile-setting operation, the income-maximizing
arbitrator would find a way to decide in favor of the general contractor. The
general contractor is not only likely to be the party that insisted upon and
drafted the arbitration clause, but also is likely to have more construction
business and therefore to produce more arbitrable disputes.
If the parties' contract does not provide for a method of arbitrator
selection, a judge will select one. 121 Where the parties have simply adopted the
rules of the AAA, and the dispute involves less than $50,000, the AAA
automatically selects an arbitrator for them. 122 If the dispute involves more
than $50,000, the AAA sends the parties a short list of potential arbitrators.
The list makes no mention that a party has the right to refuse any or all of the
choices given. 123 Upon request, only the most basic information about the
backgrounds of the arbitrators is provided. Assuming the litigant is aware of
this possibility, a litigant may be able to discover whether the arbitrator has
decided other cases involving her opponent. However, the litigant cannot learn
the results of any of these past arbitrations. 124
The possibility that the arbitrator selection procedures of AAA and other
such organizations help speed the processing of disputes does not offset the
deficiencies of such procedures. Taken together, these limitations make the
selection of the arbitrator a fairly meaningless experience. Parties seldom
know what they are getting in an arbitrator until it is too late to change.

119.
120.
121.
122.
(1993).
123.
124.

/d.
/d.
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE.§ 1281.6 (West 1994).
AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASS'N, CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY ARBITRATION RULES,§ 54(a), at 19

/d. § 13, at 9.
Rueben, supra note 17, at 55.
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Loss of The Right to a Jury Trial. Arbitration always proceeds without
a jury. For many years, however, commentators have questioned the need for
juries in civil matters, even in adjudication. 125 These commentators argue that
juries lack competence to decide disputes and greatly slow the adjudication
process. 126 Others believe that a jury, rather than a judge (or arbitrator for that
matter), is better able to express the conscience of the community with respect
to legal disputes. 127 Trial by jury also may have two less amorphous benefits.
First, according to many business management theorists, groups often are
more likely to make better quality decisions than individuals deciding alone. 128
Vroom and Jago explain this preference for group-made decisions as stemming
from three factors: (I) groups can bring to bear on a problem more information
and knowledge, (2) groups can approach a problem from a greater number of
perspectives, and (3) groups have the potential for synergy, for each member
of the group to trigger ideas in the other members of the group. 129
Second, as discussed below, the jury, at least for the parties involved in
a dispute, symbolically represents society and in this way affords the party a
sense of being heard. 130
Power of Arbitrator to Create Evidence. Arbitrators are not bound by
the evidence presented by the parties. Rather, the arbitrator, herself, may
identify or create evidence. For example, an arbitrator may, without either
party present, conduct her own, independent investigation of the facts. 131
Similarly, an arbitrator may consult with experts who have not been called as
witnesses by either party. 132 An arbitrator is even permitted, under California
law, to consult with a disinterested attorney for advice regarding her conclusions of law. 133 These rules are arguably part of what enables arbitrations to
be completed more quickly than adjudications.
The arbitrator must disclose her actions to the parties and afford them an
opportunity to meet the evidence found. 134 However, a court will not overturn
125. See FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 93, at 474.
126. /d.
127. See, e.g., Laura G. Dooley, Sounds of Silence on the Civil Jury, 26 VAL. U. L. REV. 405 (1991).
128. See VICTOR H. VROOM & ARTHUR G. ]AGO, THE NEW LEADERSHIP, 188, 94-10 I (Prentice Hall
1988). In fact, in a study of 2,631 business managers conducted by Vroom and Jago, they found that 62%
of the managers said that, if they needed a good quality decision, they would involve their subordinates in
the decision-making process. See also JON R. KATZENBACH & DOUGLASS K. SMITH, THE WISDOM OF
TEAMS 9 (McKinney & Co., Inc. 1993).
129. VROOM AND ]AGO, supra note 128, at 188.
130. See irifra note 155 and accompanying text.
131. Canadian Indemnity Co. v. Ohm, 271 Cal. App. 2d 703, 708-09 (1969).
132. /d.; See aLw Sapp v. Barenfeld, 34 Cal. 2d 515;..::,5~2.-i-1,..:.;2~1~2~P.'-.i2d~23<-i3-';,2<-i3:i.8"(1"'94"9").-------133. Griffith Co. v. San Diego College for Women, 45 Cal. 2d 501, 506-07, 289 P.2d 476, 479 (1955).
134. CAL. CIV. PRoc. CODE§ 1282.2(g) (West 1994); Canadian Indemnity Co. v. Ohm, 271 Cal. App.
2d 703,708-09 (1969).
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an arbitral decision because the arbitrator failed to inform the parties if the
failure to inform and allow the parties to meet the evidence found was not
substantially prejudicial. 135
These powers, even as limited by a duty to inform, drastically reduce each
party's ability to prepare for the arbitration and limit the predictability of the
result. On the one hand, if a party cannot be certain about what evidence the
arbitrator will consider, she cannot make informed strategy and settlement
decisions. On the other hand, the lack of preparation may cause her presentation to be more authentic.
Lack of Procedural Case-Combining Procedures.
Neither consolidation (the amalgamation of actions involving at least one common question of
law or fact) 136 nor joinder of parties (the association of several persons or
entities together as either plaintiffs or defendants) 137 is possible under
arbitration. Neither procedure is expressly authorized by arbitration law.
Also, both consolidation and joinder require that all parties have arbitration
clauses in their contracts with each other and that those arbitration clauses
expressly allow joinder and/or consolidation. 138
Consequently, arbitration lacks the two benefits which have been ascribed
to consolidation and joinder: (1) allowing the system to increase its productivity, 139 and (2) allowing courts to render complete justice without impairing the
rights of non-parties. 140 Of course, the lack of joinder and consolidation in
arbitration does help speed cases to final determination.
Symbolic and Systemic Loss Flaws
Greater Potential for Bias in an Informal Setting.
Delgado, Dunn,
Brown, Lee and Hubbert (hereinafter "Delgado et al.") argue that, although
ADR has been promoted as egalitarian, the informality of ADR actually
increases the likelihood of decision-maker prejudice, especially where a person
of less power in society confronts a person of greater power and the decisionmaker also is a person of greater power. 141 Delgado et al., note that the

135. CAL. C1V. PROC. CODE§ 1282.2(g) (West 1994); Canadian Indemnity Co. v. Ohm, 271 Cal. App.
2d 703, 708-09 (1969).
136. FR1EDENTHALET AL., supra note 93, at 315.
137. See MELLINKOFF, supra note 5, at 331-32.
138. Arbitration clauses do provide for joinder. The AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF ARCHITECTS FORM
CoNTRACT A201, is often used for or appended to construction contracts, and it expressly provides for
joinder.
139. FR1EDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 93, at 315.
140. /d. at 337.
141. Delgado et a!., supra note 17, at 1402.
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formality of adjudication, its black robes, its deference to the flag, and its
ritual, help to foster conformity to the American ideal of non-prejudicial
behavior. 142 In contrast, less structured and more intimate interactions, such
as arbitration, foster prejudice because the "human propensity to prejudge and
make irrational categorizations" is not checked by sufficient procedural
safeguards. 143
Delgado et al., therefore, recommend that people of color and members
of other traditionally disenfranchised groups would be better off opting out of
the informality of arbitration. 144
These contentions seem at odds with the argument of Gabel and Harris 145
that the formality of adjudication legitimizes the systematic social repression
of those who lack power in our society. 146 Gabel and Harris believe that the
legal system causes those who lack power to come to believe they properly
belong "underneath" those in power and therefore to accept their powerlessness.147
The formality of the legal system, however, may be used to deconstruct
the system. Gabel and Harris also argue that the symbolic formality of
adjudication creates a potential for subversion by those who wish to change the
system. 148 That potential does not exist, at least to the same degree, in a
private, informal arbitral hearing.
Loss of the Value of Precedent Creation. Arbitration decisions have no
effect as precedence. 149 On the one hand, as Gabel and Harris argue:
[A]n excessive preoccupation with 'rights-consciousness' tends in the long
run to reinforce alienation and powerlessness, because the appeal to rights
inherently affirms that the source of social power resides in the State rather
than in the people themselves. 150

On the other hand, a favorable adjudication result on an issue that is
important to a particular community, whether it is a race-based, class-based,
status-based or occupation-based community, can be exploited and shared by
others in the community. 151 In this way, the establishment of "rights" by
adjudication helps link individuals together in larger movements. On an
/d. at 1387-88.
/d. at 1388-89.
/d. at 1403.
Gabel & Harris, supra note 62.
/d. at 371.
/d.
/d. at 399-402.
Brunet, supra note 17, at 13.
Gabel & Harris, supra note 62, at 375.
Penelope E. Bryan, Toward Deconstructing the Deconstruction of Law and Lawyers, 7 i
U.L. REV. 161, 168 (1993).
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.

DEN.
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individual level, the establishment of "rights" may validate the recipients'
feelings that they have been wronged by society and encourage them to believe
in their self value. 152
Precedent also benefits the legal system because it affects behavior.
Precedent informs parties and attorneys regarding the likelihood of success; as
a result, decisions regarding the filing and settling of lawsuits are easier. This
type of informal dispute resolution occurs with little court involvement and
reduces court congestion. Precedent also guides behavior in the sense that
people strive to avoid litigation altogether by behaving in accordance with the
law.l53
Loss of Symbolic Benefit of Public Assertion of Rights.
Gabel and
Harris argue that the public assertion of rights causes persons who lack power
in society to accept their powerlessness and to reify their own repression. 154
The assertion of one's feelings of having been mistreated in a public forum,
however, may have some salutary effects.
The mere statement in a public forum that one has been wronged arguably
empowers the claimant, regardless of result. Adjudication takes place in
public, in front of an authority figure, who is clothed in the garb and with the
accoutrements of societal power. It also involves a jury, which furthers both
a sense of careful decision-making and a sense of being heard. 155 This feeling
of "having had one's day in court" is much less likely to occur in the very
private, informal atmosphere of an arbitration. The arbitrator is not clothed
with respectability and the only persons who witness the arbitral hearing are
the disputants, their attorneys and the arbitrator. This privacy may create a
feeling of secrecy and cover-up, so that the claimant feels she has not been
heard at all.
The public airing of disputes also has the potential to benefit society as
a whole. Public trials may have a symbolic value to those who witness them;
they are reminded of the ideals of this society and of their own opportunity for
redress and protection from wrongdoing. 156
Suppression of Participant Power.
Arbitration suppresses participant
power while inflating the power of the decision-maker, the arbitrator. As
shown above, the parties' power to select their decision-maker is illusory, and
the parties have no control over the flow of information. Most importantly,
unlike adjudication where the parties have a right to appeal, or mediation
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.

Grillo, supra note 7, at 1566-67.
Brunet, supra note 17, at 20, 23.
Gabel & Harris, supra note 62, at 573.
See Judith Resnick, Tiers, 51 S. CAL. L. REv. 837, 848-49 (1984).
See Parker & Hagin, supra note 55, at 1912.
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where the parties have the right to say "no," the arbitrator maintains absolute
power.
Arbitration is a Poor Substitute for Genuine Reform.
The untoward
emphasis on arbitration (as well as on other forms of ADR to some extent)
seems to be an unconscious dodging of the problems with adjudication and the
legal system as a whole. Rather than confronting these flaws and attempting
to reform or reformulate the system, lawyers, judges and academics have
embraced arbitration as well as other forms of ADR. In this sense, the
connection between the rise of ADR and the increase in criticisms of the legal
system, described above, 157 can be seen as a systemic avoidance mechanism
which deflects the focus from the core criticisms of the legal system.
Results Flaws
Lack of Legal Standards. No law requires arbitrators to follow the
applicable or controlling law, even where application of the law would
unquestionably mandate a particular result. As the California Supreme Court
recently held, "'[A]rbitrators are not bound to award on principles of dry law,
but may decide on principles of equity and good conscience, and make their
award ex aequo et bono [according to what is just and good].'" 158
As a result, parties to an arbitration may be bound by an award "reached
by paths neither marked nor traceable ...." 159
As Jane Kom argues, the absence of legal guidelines may allow for more
flexible, less rule-defined decision-making. 160 However, the absence of legal
guidelines greatly inhibits the predictability of arbitration and therefore makes
settlement of disputes very difficult. It probably also increases the likelihood
of arbitral decisions influenced by racial, class or gender prejudices, 161 or by
the arbitrator's economic self-interest. 162
Lack of Review of Arbitral Results.
Three reasons account for the
minimal review given to arbitral awards.
First, there is no written record of an arbitration. The lack of a record
insulates the arbitration decision from meaningful review. 163
157. See supra notes 54- 69 and accompanying text.
158. Moncharsh v. Heily & Blase, 3 Cal. 4th I, II. 832 P.2d 899, 904 (1992) quoting Muldrow v.
Norris, 2 Cal. 74, 77 (1852).
159. /d.
160. Kom, supra note 15, at 102.
- - - - - - - - t 6 1 . See Delgado et al., supra note 17, at 1402.
162. See Rueben, supra note 17, at 53.
163. See Moriarty v. Carlson, 184 Cal. App. 2d 51, 54 (1960) (if there is no record for review,
findings of arbitrator are presumed correct).
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Second, an arbitrator has no duty to explain her decision. 164 In fact, AAA
tells its arbitrators that they should not explain the reasons for their decision so
as to insulate their awards from review. Therefore, arbitrators regularly refuse
to explain or justify their decisions. 165
Third, in the majority of jurisdictions, an appellate court may review an
arbitral decision only if the award or the arbitration involved fraud, corruption
or undue means. 166 Appellate courts do not review the form and sufficiency
of the evidence, nor the credibility and good faith of the parties and witnesses
nor the arbitrator's conclusions of fact. 167 Neither may appellate courts review
the arbitrator's interpretation of a contract, 168 nor her conclusions of law or
application of law to fact. 169 Even an egregious error of law is not
reviewable. 170
Without the time and expense of appeal, and because arbitrators are not
concerned by the possibility of review, arbitrations proceed to decision more
cheaply and rapidly. On the other hand, the lack of control over the results of
arbitrations increase the likelihood of results influenced by bias or by the
arbitrator's own economic self-interest because the arbitrator knows she cannot
be overruled. The unavailability of appeal also reduces predictability in
arbitral results and the attendant benefits of predictability, such as assisting
parties in making decisions regarding the filing and settling of lawsuits.
Possibility of Lesser Accuracy. Edward Brunet argues that an important
goal of any dispute resolution process is "accurate" results. 171 However,
deficiencies in all forms of ADR cause all forms of ADR to be less "accurate"
than adjudication. 172 According to Brunet, the lack of effective discovery in
ADR causes a loss of information, and that information "is essential to quality
decision making." 173 Furthermore, the lack of reasoned statements of decision
in ADR also inhibits accuracy. 174
Quality dispute resolution, according to Brunet, also requires a following
of the principles of substantive law because the substantive law establishes

164. Sapp v. Barenfeld, 34 Cal.2d 515, 522,212 P.2d 233,239 (1949).
165. Rau, supra note 15, at 2028 n.85.
166. Moncharsh v. Heily & Blase, 3 Cal.4th I, 21-22, 832 P.2d 899, 911 (1992).
167. /d.
168. Wetsel v. Garibaldi, 159 Cal. App. 2d 4, 12 (1958).
169. Moncharsh, 3 Cal.4th at 23, 832 P.2d at 912.
170. See, e.g., Woodard v. Southern Cal. Permanente Medical Group, 171 Cal. App. 3d 656, 662
( 1985). A minority of jurisdictions do permit review of such errors. See infra note 192 and accompanying
text.
171. Brunet, supra note 17, at 15.
172. /d. at 54-55.
173. /d. at 33-34.
174. /d. at 43.
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norms for decision-making. 175 He argues that the lack of legal standards for
decision-making may prevent the ADR decision-maker from remaining
impartial. 176
Other factors, not discussed by Brunet, which may reduce the accuracy
of arbitration include the lack of arbitrator ethics or review, the lack of witness
oaths, and the lack of required qualifications to be an arbitrator. The absence
of these factors opens up possibilities of abuse and therefore of inaccuracy.
Even if one does not quite share Brunet's faith in identifying "quality" in
decision making or his implicit belief that a "truth" can exist or be found in a
dispute, 177 his assertion that decisions can be better informed through
discovery, and less biased through the use of precedent to set guiding norms,
make sense.
The Relationship Between the Asserted Deficiencies of Arbitration and the
Asserted Benefits of Arbitration
What is ironic about the deficiencies of arbitration described above is that
they stem, in large part, from the benefits of arbitration. Each asserted benefit
of arbitration resonates in the deficiencies such that the deficiencies appear
almost inherent in the institution of arbitration.
For example, to preserve the benefits of greater speed and lower cost,
arbitration cannot include a formal pleading requirement, discovery or jury
trials. In fact, the lack of pleading and discovery are cited both as benefits of
arbitration and as explanations for the greater speed and lower cost of
arbitration. 178
Pleading, discovery and juries usually require extensive involvement by
attorneys, and both pleading and discovery involve the risk of attorney abuse.
Pleading and discovery also require a decision-maker to have legal expertise,
a requirement which conflicts with an asserted benefit of arbitration, the ability
to use expert decision-makers.
The choice to avoid applying the rules of evidence in arbitration stems
from the same three asserted benefits of arbitration. Speed would be decreased
and cost would be increased by a system that requires the decision-maker to
evaluate evidentiary objections. More importantly, the desire for expert
decision-makers, who often are non-lawyers, limits the possibility of applying
the rules of evidence.
175. /d. at 25.
176. id. at 26.
177. Brunet notes the subjectivity of the tem1"quality." /d. at 8. Nevertheless, Brunet operates under
an assumption that he can define "quality" and apply it to adjudication and ADR.
178. Rau, supra note 15, at 2027-28.
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The relationship between the lack of an oath requirement and of ready
sanctions for perjury, on the one hand, and the asserted benefits of arbitration,
on the other hand, is less clear. Perhaps these deficiencies can be linked to the
greater informality of arbitration which stems, in turn, from the speed and cost
considerations. Further, the fact that an expert, rather than a judge, is involved
greatly inhibits the use of oaths and sanctions for perjury.
Deficiencies in arbitrator selection can be directly tied to the twin goals
of greater speed and lower cost. Evidence of the connection between the
desire for speed and low cost and the deficiencies in selection is demonstrated
by the AAA's policy of selecting the arbitrator for the parties as part of its
"expedited procedures.'' 179 In other words, greater speed requires less
participant involvement in the arbitrator selection process. Moreover, the
expense required for full arbitrator background disclosure, for reviews of
arbitrator competency and for administration of arbitrator ethical standards
surely would be passed on to the consumers of arbitral services in the form of
greater fees.
The use of "expert" decision-makers may have played a role in conferring
power to arbitrators to conduct their own independent investigations. This
power may derive from a belief that arbitrators, unlike judges in adjudication,
are likely either to need or to seek such help. Allowing arbitrators to conduct
their own, independent investigations also could stem from the desire for
greater informality in arbitration (which has both speed and cost ramifications).
The inability to consolidate cases or to join parties results from the private
nature of arbitration agreements. Such agreements, like all contractual
promises, bind only the parties involved and only to the extent specified
therein.
The privacy and informality of arbitration, the desire for flexible arbitral
decisions and the use of "expert" (non-lawyer) decision-makers combine to
prevent arbitral decisions from having effect as precedents and cause a loss of
the benefits that attend the creation of precedent. Likewise, the use of "expert"
decision-makers who are not attorneys or judges and the desire for flexibility
necessarily include a trade-off in the arbitrator's ignorance of legal doctrine
andin the legal system's inability to review arbitral decisions.
The increased possibility of arbitrator prejudice, the dis-empowerment of
the participants and the potential for inaccuracy all stem from combinations of
the deficiencies and therefore arise out of the asserted benefits of arbitration.
For example, the greater potential for inaccuracy in arbitration is a result of the
lack of discovery and pleadings and the failure to require the application of
179. AAA FoRM, supra note 90, §§53-57.
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legal doctrines. These deficiencies, as shown above, spring from the asserted
benefits of arbitration.
Conclusions Regarding the Deficiencies in Arbitration

Two overarching points can be made regarding the deficiencies in
arbitration. First, the proponents who trumpet arbitration have ignored some
very troubling deficiencies in arbitration. Second, and perhaps more
importantly, the deficiencies in arbitration all come directly from the benefits
of arbitration. This latter fact makes reform of arbitration very challenging.

N.

POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS FOR THE DEFICIENCIES IN ARBITRATION

Solutions for deficiencies in arbitration potentially lie in two separate
spheres. Both the legislatures and courts have the power to regulate the
arbitration process. Parties, however, need not wait for either governmental
branch to act; parties may try to address arbitration deficiencies themselves by
drafting their arbitration agreements to address the deficiencies. 180
This section examines how arbitration law might be changed, either by
statute, case law or by the parties' arbitration agreement. As explained in Part
V, some of the deficiencies in arbitration cannot be fixed. For example, the
symbolic or systemic flaws cannot really be addressed by reforms in
arbitration. Also, solutions that have no genuine possibility of occurring
because they cannot, as a practical matter, be grafted onto arbitration, are not
addressed in this section. This section therefore does not address adding jury
trials to arbitration, allowing arbitrations to have precedential effect or making
arbitrations into public hearings.
Process Solutions
Claim Disclosure Solutions

It would not be particularly hard to require greater pleading formality in
arbitration. Parties could be required to disclose their theories of liability and
defense. Likewise, modern discovery procedures could be added to arbitration.
Under California law, for example, if the arbitration agreement expressly
adopts Code of Civil Procedure § 1283.05, the parties are permitted to conduct
180. Any suggestion that procedures or provisions be created by the parties' arbitration agreement
must take into account the concern of those who regularly draft contracts, that a party who
proposes a very detailed arbitration clause may be forced to trade off "deal points" to obtain assent to a
detailed arbitration clause. A party who proposes a detailed arbitration clause also may be seen as
introducing an undesirable adversarial emphasis into the contract negotiations. Finally, some parties may
want to take advantage of the slow speed and expense of adjudication to exploit their greater economic
wherewithal.
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discovery, subject to the limitation that approval be obtained from the
arbitrator to take depositions. 181
California law also provides that, if the amount of money in dispute
exceeds $50,000, and the arbitrator is properly informed of the request, either
party may obtain a list of the other party's percipient and expert witnesses and
the documents the other party intends to introduce. 182 There is no reason that
such disclosure could not be required in all cases.
Edward Brunet recommends that any solution in this area incorporate
greater judicial involvement to help ensure, through the court's contempt
powers, that the disputants are forthcoming in sharing information with each
other. 183
Evidentiary Control
Similarly, the parties, legislatures or courts could require, in whole or
part, the application of the rules of evidence in arbitration. California law only
provides that the "rules of evidence ... need not be observed," 184 suggesting
at least the possibility that the parties can contractually bind themselves and the
arbitrator to following the rules of evidence.
Witness Honesty
California arbitration law also permits a party, by request, to require that
the witnesses testify under oath. 185 There is no reason that such an oath should
not always be included. As I explain below, enforcement of any oath,
however, is much more difficult. 186
Selection and Qualifications of the Arbitrator
The parties themselves or the legislature could establish minimum
qualifications which an arbitrator must possess. It is even possible to require
arbitrators to undergo special training, testing and licensing procedures. The
parties or the legislature can require the arbitrator to swear an oath and the
legislature could establish professional obligations for all those who hold
themselves out as arbitrators, while arbitrator organizations could adopt ethical
guidelines.
181. CAL. Ov. PRoc. CODE§§ 1283.1, 1283.05(e) (West 1982). No such provision is included in the
Uniform Arbitration Act which has been adopted, by the most recent count, in 35 states. Table of
Jurisdictions Wherein Act Has Been Adopted, UNIF. ARBITRATION Acr, 7 U.L.A. I (Supp. 1994).
182. CAL. CIV. PRoc. CODE§ 1282.2(a)(2) (West 1982). Copies of such documents must be made
available to the other party for inspection. /d.
183. Brunet, supra note 17, at 53-54.
184. CAL. CIV. PRoc. CODE§ 1282.2(d) (West 1982).
185. !d.
186. See infra note 205 and accompanying text.
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Arbitrator's Power To Create Evidence
The legislature and the parties to an arbitration agreement also have the
ability to curb or even eliminate the arbitrator's power to conduct her own
investigation and to consult with experts of her own choosing. California, as
noted above, requires the arbitrator to inform the parties of such activities and
to allow them to address whatever she learns on her own. 187 It would only be
a small step to prohibit such activity altogether.

Result Solutions
Lack of Legal Standards
Arbitration law or the parties' arbitration agreement can require the
arbitrator to follow the applicable law. In dicta, at least one California court
has suggested that the parties can make a binding agreement that the arbitrator
must follow the law. 188

Lack of Review
First, law or the parties' arbitration agreement may require the arbitration
be stenographically recorded, and the arbitrator may be required to issue a
detailed statement of the decision. Second, at least theoretically, an arbitration
agreement can provide for a right of appeal. In Kauffman v. Shearson Hayden
Stone, Inc., 189 the parties' arbitration agreement provided for appellate review
of the arbitrator's decision. 190 Kauffman did not address the propriety of such
a clause, but at least the court did not indicate that such a clause was improper.
Edward Brunet advocates a lesser degree of review; he proposes that a
brief form of judicial scrutiny be included before the matter is heard and,
again, after the matter has been decided, when the court is in the process of
affirming the arbitral award. 191 As a student note explains, some of the state
courts have experimented with varying standards of limited appellate review
such as "gross legal error," "manifest disregard of the law," and "error on the
face" of the award. 192
187. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE§ 1282.2 (West 1982); Canadian Indemnity Co. v. Ohm, 271 Cal. App.
2d 703,708-709 (1969). Ohm, however,limits this rule to situations where the failure to inform the parties
prejudices the other party. /d.
188. Harris v. Havennr, 169 Cal. App. 2d 531,534 (1959).
189. 128 Cal. App. 3d 809 (1982).
190. /d.at811.
191. Brunet, supra note 17, at 53.
192. Cheryl Aptowitzer, Note, Judicial Review of Arbitration Awards- Courts May Review and
Vacate an Arbitration Award Where an Arbitration Commits Gross, Unmistakable, or Not Reasonably
Debatable Errors of Law or Where the Arbitration Manifestly Disregards the Law and the Result is Unjust-
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V. WHY ARBITRATION MUST COLLAPSE

This addresses the efficacy of the proposed solutions. First, the
deficiencies that cannot be addressed by refonn of arbitration are identified.
Second, the proposed refonns themselves are evaluated and some of the
difficulties that might arise in implementing the refonns are explained.
Finally, I argue that the refonn of arbitration will destroy its efficacy.
Inability to Address All the Deficiencies of Arbitration

Any refonn of arbitration simply cannot address all of its deficiencies.
Arbitration is not susceptible to the addition of certain procedural refonns,
such as adding jury trials or allowing consolidation and joinder. Arbitration
also cannot really be refonned in such a way as to meaningfully redress its
symbolic and systemic flaws.
Unremediable Process Flaws

As a practical matter, it probably would be impossible to establish a jury
trial system for arbitrations. The legal system has the power to compel
potential jurors, at least those who lack one of the excuses recognized by the
jurisdiction, to serve through the threat of sanctions. 193 No such power could
be conferred on private dispute resolution. Moreover, the administration of a
jury system would be hopelessly complicated.
In adjudication, the jury usually decides the questions of fact and the
judge decides the questions of law. 194 How such a division might work for an
arbitration is unfathomable. Parties chose arbitration because, among other
things, they desire a decision-maker who has special expertise. If a jury, rather
than the arbitrator, were deciding the factual issues, there no longer would be
a need for an arbitrator as opposed to a judge. Also, the arbitrator, under such
a scenario, would be relegated to deciding legal issues, a task for which she
may not be qualified.
For a very different reason, the case combining procedures of consolidation and joinder cannot be grafted onto arbitration. Binding arbitration is
mostly the exclusive realm of contract law; the parties must agree that their
dispute(s) will be resolved by arbitration. The procedures of joinder and
consolidation, of course, necessarily require that the person who is joined or
the case that is consolidated be subject to the jurisdiction of the combining
Perini Corp. v. Great Bay Hotel and Casino Inc., 129 N.J. 479,610 A.2d 364 (1992}, 24 SETON HALLL.
REV. 998 (1993).
193. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 93, § ll.IO, at 523.
194. /d. § 11.2, at 478.
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court. 195 In arbitration, jurisdiction is conferred by the parties' arbitration
agreement. There is no way to assure that parties whose joinder or consolidation may be sought also are bound to contractual arbitration clauses, nor is
there any guarantee that such clauses also would contain a provision allowing
joinder or consolidation.

Unremediable Symbolic or Systemic Flaws
An arbitrator's greater potential for bias also cannot be remedied. The
potential for bias, as Delgado et al. argue, stems from the informality of
arbitration and therefore is endemic to the nature of arbitration. 196 Likewise,
by its very nature, arbitration cannot remedy the loss of creating precedent or
create the personal gains from the public airing of grievances.
While the
reforms discussed above can help address some of the deficiencies in
arbitration that cause the suppression of participant power and the creation of
disproportionate arbitrator power, as discussed below, these power issues are
inherent in any form of binding arbitration and cannot be remedied without
destroying the asserted benefits of arbitration.
The possibility that arbitration is a convenient distraction from the
problems with adjudication also cannot be addr~ssed by reforming arbitration.
Rather, this problem requires the members of the legal system and society to
confront the problems of adjudication by questioning the very essence of the
legal system.

Potential Complexities in Individual Solutions
On their face, the solutions suggested above appear relatively straightforward and easy to implement; in fact, they may be hopelessly complicated, and
they would create as many problems as they would solve.

Claim Disclosure Solutions
Both the pleading and discovery solutions raise a number of important
and intricate sub-issues. Reform of arbitration pleading would require
assessment of which aspects of modern pleading law to incorporate. Most
jurisdictions require some form of notice or fact pleading. 197 However, if a
claim is not entirely based on legal doctrine, which is permissible under
arbitration law, 198 the form of such notice is problematic. The addition of
discovery to arbitration raises an even greater number of complications. On
195. /d. § 6.5, at 342.
196. See supra notes 141-144 and accompanying text.
197. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 93, § 5.4, at 244.
198. Moncharsh v. Heily & Blase, 3 Cal. 4th I, II , 832 P.2d 899,904 (1992).
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the one hand, there is a desire to limit the amount of discovery to preserve the
speed and lower cost advantages for which arbitration is lauded. This
inclination is manifested in California's deposition limitations. 199 On the other
hand, the need for information in any particular case depends on a number of
factors that any rigid limitation could not consider. The factors include: the
complexity of the issues in the case, the number of issues, how cooperative the
parties and their attorneys are, the difficulty of finding witnesses, the extent of
the need for expert testimony and the nature of the expertise needed, the
economic resources of the parties, the amount of money at stake in the dispute,
and the significance of the issues at stake to the parties. It is widely perceived
that discovery is regularly abused in adjudication; 200 the absence of a successful
solution to this problem for adjudication suggests the difficulty of establishing
optimal limitations on discovery in any form of dispute resolution.
Enforcement of discovery rights, once established, presents equally
perplexing problems. California law provides that, if discovery is permitted,
the arbitrator has the same powers with respect to enforcement as a judge in a
superior court action. 201 Such powers seem fairly necessary to give discovery
rights any genuine meaning. Those powers, however, include the ability to
punish "abuse" (which includes non-compliance and over-use) by: (1)
monetary sanctions (charging the abuser the other party's expenses in
consequence of the abuse); (2) issue sanctions (deciding an issue adversely to
the abuser); (3) evidence sanctions (preventing the abuser from introducing
evidence that was the subject of an abuse); (4) terminating sanction (adversely
deciding an entire lawsuit or claim against the abuser); and/or (5) contempt
sanctions (treating abuse as a form of contempt). 202
These powers raise troubling questions regarding the capacity of all
arbitrators to understand and apply discovery law, the ability to create some
form of immediate appellate court review, such as mandamus, the awkwardness of tailoring sanctions to particular issues given the informality in the
pleadings, and the difficulty of conferring contempt power on an arbitrator.
Even if contempt power could be conferred on an arbitrator, conferring such
a power raises other important questions. 203

199. Depositions are allowed in California arbitrations only upon application to the arbitrator and only
if the arbitrator permits them. CAL. Clv. PRoc. CODE § 1283.05(e) (West 1982).
200. See FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 93, § 7 .18, at 422.
201. CAL. Civ. PRoc. CODE§ 1283.05(b), (c) (West 1982).
202. CAL. Clv. PRoc. CODE§ 2023 (West 1982).
203. For example, a judge can order that a person be jailed for contempt. DAN B. DOBBS, LAw OF
REMEDIES§ 2.8(1), at 130 (2d ed.). Could and should an arbitrator be given the power to jail persons she
holds in contempt? How can an arbitrator be given such power?
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Evidentiary Control
Problems also confound the application of evidence law in arbitrations.
First, the capacity of arbitrators to develop sufficient fluency with the nuances
of evidence law seems questionable. Second, time and informality constraints
make including the entire body of evidence law in arbitration undesirable, yet
it is difficult to determine which aspects to include or exclude. Most
importantly, we assume that a judge who hears inadmissible evidence can
ignore its possibly prejudicial effect because of her experience, her familiarity
with evidence law, her awareness of the possibility of appellate review of any
biased decision, and her required professional ethics. 204 With an arbitrator,
these controlling factors either may be less powerful or non-existent. The
arbitrator's ability to avoid being prejudiced by improper evidence is entirely
dependent on the arbitrator's educationaland employment background, life
experience and values.
Witness Honesty
The inclusion of an oath requirement raises similar enforcement issues as
well as other, more serious concerns. In adjudication, perjury exists as the
threat that, at least theoretically, inhibits witness dishonesty. However, the
mechanisms for punishing perjury committed in arbitration are not readily
apparent; it is likely that the arbitrator herself would have to testify in any
perjury hearing.
Moreover, the informality of arbitration itself may encourage dishonesty
in much the same way that the informality of arbitration fosters bias. Other
forms of socially desirable behavior other than egalitarianism, such as
truthfulness may also be less likely to occur in arbitration than in adjudication,
where the formality, ritual and the positioning of the judge (above everyone)
may create pressure to act honestly. 205 At the very least, a judge is a much
more imposing figure, by her positioning, dress and reputation than an
arbitrator, who wears business clothes, sits across the table from the witness
and has no pre-existing cultural image. Fear of punishment for perjury is
therefore much more likely in adjudication than in arbitration.
Selection and Qualifications of the Arbitrator
The proposed solutions to the problems of selection and qualifications of
arbitrators also are more complicated than they appear at first glance.
204. See generally McCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note I 04, § 60, at 238.
205. Social psychologists believe that people change their behavior to conform to what is expected
of them, especially in very formal settings. Delgado et al., supra note 17, at 1387-88.
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Deciding who is qualified to arbitrate raises questions regarding what personal
qualities, professional experiences and educational backgrounds might be
predictive of skillful dispute decision-making. Because arbitration occurs
privately, and therefore cannot be effectively studied, the possibility of
empirically testing any set of proposed qualifications does not exist. Even if
arbitration were not private, decision-making skill simply may be too
subjective a criterion to consider.
Even a carefully crafted set of ethical standards would only be of limited
help. The privacy of arbitrations make enforcement of such standards nearly
impossible. To avoid sanctions for violating any such standards, an arbitrator
who wishes to maximize the likelihood of return business needs only one,
significant disputed fact on which she can claim to have based her decision.
Arbitrators therefore can insulate themselves from criticism or punishment for
misbehavior. This problem is compounded by the proposal to establish
arbitrator qualifications. If the pool of arbitrators is too limited, even the best
set of ethical standards cannot prevent arbitrators from being selected to decide
disputes involving parties who have appeared before them on prior occasions,
and who will appear before them in the future.
Results Solutions

Requiring arbitrators to follow the law and subjecting arbitral decisions
to appellate review also will be difficult to implement. A requirement that
arbitrators follow the law is only meaningful if appellate review exists to verify
that the arbitrator followed the law. Moreover, for appellate rights to be
effective, the decision-maker must posses subs~tiallegal sophistication and
the proceedings must be stenographically or audio-visually recorded. The
existing, already-burdened appellate system would have to be adapted to
handle arbitral appeals. Standards of review could vary from the adjudication
206
standards, as they presently do, or courts could treat arbitration appeals just
like they treat adjudication appeals. Either possibility raises additional
problems.
The current standards of review for arbitration require that the error fit
into a narrow and, at the same time, indeterminate definition (i.e., "gross
207
error," "error on the face of the award," "manifest disregard of the law"); as
a result, appellate success is unpredictable and haphazard. On the other hand,
the adjudication standards of review are tailored to the adjudication form of
decision-making (which includes juries as fact-finders, for example, which is
206. See Aptowitzer, supra note 192, at 1001.
207. /d. at 1001-03.
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not possible in arbitration) and therefore may prove difficult to apply to
private, closed, arbitrator-decided arbitration results.
The Conflict Between the Solutions for Arbitration Deficiencies and the
Nature of Arbitration

Even if arbitration's problems could be solved and we were to decide that
we can live with our inability to solve some of the deficiencies of arbitration,
arbitration would not survive the refonn process. Regarding the proposal that
review of arbitration be expanded, the California Supreme Court noted in
Moncharsh, "[e]xpanding the availability of judicial review of such decisions
'would tend to deprive the parties to the arbitration agreement of the very
advantages th~ process is intended to produce."'208
This conclusion stemmed from the court's perception that any change to
arbitration that either incorporates the legal system or its procedures necessarily conflicts with the parties' desire to bypass that system. 209 Close examination of the proposed solutions discussed above reveals that the proposed
changes would only transfonn arbitration into a poorer, less attractive fonn of
adjudication while virtually eliminating the asserted benefits of arbitration.
The creation of discovery rights, pleading rights, evidentiary objections
and an obligation to follow the law would eliminate the possibility in most, if
not all, cases of using decision-makers who may not be trained in the law but
who possess technical expertise in the industry, trade or profession in dispute.
Legal issues require decision-makers who possess training, knowledge and
skill in legal analysis. Indeed, it seems likely that any suggested list of
arbitrator qualifications would include legal expertise. Further, the need for
decision-makers with legal expertise will severely limit the number of
available arbitrators. Any reduction in the supply of available decision-makers
has at least the potential to impact the speed of decision-making.
Privacy also would have to be sacrificed in the name of refonn, at least
to the extent that the arbitral decisions could be appealed by the non-prevailing
party. The current, strict limits on appellate review almost certainly serve to
discourage appeal; an expansion of the grounds for appeal necessarily would
increase the likelihood of such appeal.
Moreover, the addition of adjudication procedures will substantially
reduce the time and cost savings of arbitration. Pleading motion practice,
discovery and discovery motion practice, evidentiary objections and rulings,
even oath requirements and enforcement of oaths all consume substantial time
208. Moncharsh v. Heily & Blase, 3 Cal. 4th I, 10 (1992).
209. /d.
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and increase attorney fees. Likewise, any requirement that the proceedings be
recorded and other efforts to create an appellate record, such as detailed
statements of decision, will also prolong the arbitration process and increase
the cost of arbitration. In arbitration, the increase in cost by all of these
procedures is magnified by the fact that the parties must pay for the arbitrator's
time. Legal accuracy by the arbitrator in all of these areas (discovery,
pleading, evidence, substantive law) will require substantial effort and time.
Consequently, the time and cost savings that arguably justify arbitration in the
first place would be minimized and probably lost altogether.
Finally, if the arbitrator is required to follow the law she loses the
flexibility to make non-traditional and creative decisions. Instead of making
a relationship-preserving decision, she is forced to make a decision that
categorizes the participants into winners and losers because the law she must
apply almost always requires such decisions.
In short, arbitration must be fixed, yet it cannot be fixed and still survive.
Arbitration left unchanged is intolerably flawed; arbitration modified loses the
qualities that make it attractive. Accordingly, arbitration cannot survive as an
important form of dispute resolution.
CONCLUSION

In addition to having revealed the intractable flaws of arbitration, I hope
this article has offered some insight into how the legal system has defined its
own problems and then confined the solutions. Arbitration and adjudication
are presented as a matched set of either-or choices, yet neither is particularly
attractive on its own, and both can be "reformed" only through a process of
becoming more like the other. The question posed by this apparent Catch-22
becomes troubling. If adjudication is flawed and arbitration should neither be
kept the same nor reformed, what can we do?
An answer may lie within the supernova analogy with which I began this
article. Scientists theorize that, after a supernova has collapsed into a neutron
star, the debris spreads into space and may be reformulated, with other
ingredients, into a new star. 210 A similar possibility exists in the collapse of
arbitration. This opportunity could be a chance to use what we have learned
from arbitration to devise a new and better form of ADR. Better yet, the
collapse of arbitration affords us a chance to examine the legal system in ways
similar to those expressed herein and to contemplate either meaningful reform

210. LIGHTMAN, supra note I, at 46.
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of that system or to contemplate how to reenginee.-2 11 a legal system that is
more responsive to its users.
The benefits asserted for arbitration might be incorporated in either a
reform or a reengineering of the legal system. Accordingly, any such reform
or reengineering should attempt to incorporate: greater accessibility through
reduced cost, speedy resolution of disputes, less rigid adherence to legal
doctrine where such adherence conflicts with justice and/or the interests of the
parties, an ability to identify and benefit from expert decision-makers, and the
ability to fashion decisions that do not polarize the parties into winners and
losers. At the same time, such reform or reengineering should try to avoid the
deficiencies outlined in this article.
The collapse of arbitration presents an opportunity that should not be
missed.

211. Reengineering is the "fundamental rethinking and the radical redesign of ... processes to achieve
dramatic improvements in critical ... measures of performance .... " MICHAEL HAMMER & JAMES
CHAMPY, REENGINEERING THE CORPORATION: A MANIFESTO FOR BUSINESS REVOLUTION, 32 (Harper
Business 1993). Although Hammer and Champy's ideas were conceived for businesses interested in
changing themselves, they also have meaning for change in the legal system. A fundamental rethinking
about how the legal system does its business is in order.

